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Abstract 
 
Ghosh’s model is discussed in this paper under two alternative scenarios. In an open 
version we compare it with Leontief’s model and prove that they reduce to each other 
under some specific productive conditions. We then move onto reconsidering Ghosh’s 
model alleged implausibility and we do so reformulating the model to incorporate a 
closure rule. The closure solves, to some extent, the implausibility problem very clearly 
put out by Oosterhaven for then value–added is correctly computed and responsive to 
allocation changes resulting from supply shocks.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the validity and plausibility of the so called ‘supply-driven’ input-output 
model of Ghosh (1958) seems to keep resurfacing every so often. The difficulty to 
interpret Ghosh’s model within conventional production theory has led to numerous 
interpretations and assertions that, periodically, put into question the structure and 
meaning of the model. Giarratani (1980), for instance, discussed the lack of well 
understood economic behaviour behind it.  Oosterhaven (1988, 1989), in turn, called the 
attention over the ‘implausibility’ of a model that allocates output in response to 
changes in value–added in a given sector without those changes in output translating 
into further changes in value–added. In whatever way output turns out to be produced 
and allocated among sectors it surely makes little sense that value–added is not 
responsive to a general system reallocation. Dietzenbacher (1997) ‘vindicates’ Ghosh 
by way or reinterpreting it as a price model, which then happens to be fully formally 
equivalent to Leontief’s price model and we are back to the well-known and standard 
interindustry model.  More recently de Mesnard (2009) has claimed the model to be 
‘uninteresting’ since it is implausible as an output model, unnecessary as a price model 
and less informative than Leontief’s dual quantity and price models. More in-depth 
discussion and details can be found in the references provided by these authors but the 
essence of the problematic issues about Ghosh’s model has been sufficiently laid out.  
We will organize our discussion here distinguishing two aspects. First, on the 
‘validity’ side, we will analyze Ghosh’s model vis a vis Leontief’s and we will do so 
under the standard open model configurations. We show that both models, even though 
they share some basic common linearity assumptions, are in fact incompatible except 
when quantities are held constant. In this case we show that they reduce to each other 
and Dietzenbacher’s (1997) proposal is in fact reinforced. Second, we address the 
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‘plausibility’ debate regarding unresponsive value-added that was pointed out by 
Oosterhaven’s (1989, 1989). His criticism still stands since unresponsive value–added 
to output changes is a hard to sell economic fact. Under Ghosh’s model conditions, 
suppose that value–added in sector j, say, increases. When this shock is subsequently 
absorbed by the output allocation system, we observe an increase in the output of sector 
i ( )i j≠ , as a result of the endogenous output reallocation, but at the same time value–
added in sector i is surprisingly unaffected. Needless to say this seems to violate 
common sense as well as some version of Debreu’s axiom on the impossibility of the 
Land of Cockaigne (Debreu, 1959, chapter 3). Let us consider for a moment Leontief’s 
open quantity model. When autonomous final demand for good j increases, the system 
generates increases in output and value–added in all sectors. There is more value–added 
around but this does not have, however, any effect whatsoever in final demand for other 
goods ( )i j≠ . This is also somewhat surprising as far as economic logic goes. How can 
it be that consumption behaves in an unresponsive way to the new additional income? 
There are at least two ways out of this situation. The first one is to close Leontief’s open 
model and make consumption endogenous using linearity assumptions. The second one 
is to move up from the input-output model towards general equilibrium models where 
consumption is endogenous and price and income responsive. If Ghosh’s model is not 
‘plausible’ because value–added is unresponsive to output reallocations, then a similar 
case could be made for Leontief’s model being somewhat ‘implausible’ too because of 
the fact that consumption is unresponsive to income generation. This having been said, 
perhaps the road to endow Ghosh’s model with a bit more plausibility is formally 
similar to the road taken with Leontief’s model: close it with an additional layer of 
endogeneity. If for Leontief we make the ‘driving demand’ force (consumption) 
endogenous, then for Ghosh we may attempt to make the ‘driving supply’ force (value–
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added) endogenous. Since Ghosh’s model shares the basic mathematical linearity of the 
standard interindustry model, closing it may follow the same formal logic. We first need 
a rule stipulating a relationship between value–added and some output measure and, 
secondly, we need an instrument that reflects and captures external supply shocks that 
are subsequently incorporated into the allocation system. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we compare both models and 
examine their relationship under their open versions, we summarize the main 
conclusions drawn by previous researchers and we supply a new proof regarding their 
formal connection. In Section 3 we extend Ghosh’s model by formulating a possible 
closure rule. We verify its consequences for a correct accounting of output changes as 
well as value–added changes. We then illustrate the results with some numerical 
examples in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE OPEN VERSION OF GHOSH’S MODEL:  
    IF PLAUSIBLE, IT REDUCES TO LEONTIEF PRICE MODEL.   
Without a doubt, one of Leontief’s most enduring contributions was to provide 
analysts with an empirically applicable general equilibrium system. Ignoring the 
difference between industry and commodity, in Leontief‘s system each intermediate 
input is only a function of total output:  
 ( )ij ij jx X= Θ           (1) 
In Leontief’s model, inputs are used in fixed proportions and there is a unique 
technique for each sector. Since input substitution is not allowed, changes in relative 
prices have no influence on technical coefficients.  For an economy with n goods and 
industries, the production function for this non-substitution case can be written as: 
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1
1
Min ,...., 1,....,j njj
j nj
x x
X j n
a a
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= ∀ =⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
     (2) 
where ija  indicates the (minimal) amount of good i required to produce a single unit of 
output j, and the technology represented in (2) corresponds to the inverse function of 
(1), which refers to the conditional input demand functions. According to the 
assumptions in Leontief’s model, the supply-demand balance equations, that state how 
total production is distributed among intermediate and final uses, can be presented as a 
system of n equations with n unknowns 1 2, ,..., nX X X : 
1
n
j ij i j
i
X a X f
=
= ⋅ +∑         (3) 
where fj is final demand for good j. In simpler matrix notation, the system in (3) can be 
written as: 
⋅X = A X + f          (4) 
Provided some technicalities that are associated to matrix A are satisfied1, Expression 
(4) can be solved having a non-negative solution:       
( ) ⋅-1X = I - A f             (5) 
with ( )-1I - A  being the so-called Leontief inverse. This inverse can also be expressed as 
the sum of direct and indirect effects from unitary changes in the exogenous vector f, 
culminating in a matrix of multipliers: 
 ( )
0
.....
s
∞
=
= ∑-1 2 3 s(I - A) = I + A + A + A + A      (6) 
Combining (5) and (6) we observe: 
                                                 
1 A is non-negative, productive and (I-A) is singular. See Waugh (1950). 
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 .... ....⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅2 3 kX = f + A f + A f + A f + + A f +     (7) 
These multipliers stem from the existing input demand inter-industrial linkages.  
Equation (7) indicates how the level of output of each sector is generated “round” by 
“round”, capturing how industrial interdependencies take place in the economy “down 
the stream” and showing the consolidated structure of the economy’s production chains.  
Leontief’s original formulation assumes that all price effects are neglected. This has 
led to a consideration of the Leontief model as a “quantity model”, i.e. each of the 
equations of the system (3) links the physical inputs requirements of the i-th sector to 
the output level of the j-th sector.  This does not imply that changes in prices cannot be 
reflected when using Leontief’s’ approach. These variations in prices can be evaluated 
but changes in values and quantities are not simultaneous within this model. This is in 
fact one of the distinctive characteristics of input-output analysis and Leontief’s 
theoretical approach. It closely corresponds to the case of a competitive equilibrium 
where the supply curve is perfectly elastic and thus the overall situation, in terms of 
equilibrium quantities, is determined by the demand side. 
Ghosh (1958) considered Leontief’s model appropriate for describing this economic 
reality. Ghosh pointed out, however, that in certain situations that depart from the 
perfectly competitive scenario with excess capacity allocation considerations rather than 
technological ones should play a major role.  In a formally similar way to Leontief’s 
model, in the Ghosh system intermediate input purchases are also a function of total 
output: 
( )ij ij ix g X=          (8) 
but now Xi refers to the sum of rows in the input-output table, that is, total commodity 
sales delivered by the i-th sector. The inverse function of (8), however, does not 
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correspond to any production function (Oosterhaven, 1988) but rather to an allocation or 
distribution function of the form: 
1
* *
1
,.....,i ini
i in
x xX Max
a a
⎧ ⎫= ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
       (9) 
where *ija  represents now the so-called allocation or supply coefficients, which are 
assumed to be fixed. Any increase in the production of sector i will therefore be 
allocated in a fixed proportion to all the recipient sectors. Differently to Ghosh’s model, 
in Leontief’s model, these supply coefficients do not remain fixed when there is an 
exogenous change in final demand. In other words, under Leontief’s model 
assumptions, the ex-ante and ex-post allocation coefficients differ when there is an 
exogenous shock in final demand while input coefficients remain constant. The 
situation reverses when using the Ghoshian approach; when there is an exogenous 
change in value-added, the ex-ante and ex-post input coefficients differ while allocation 
coefficients remain constant. 
According to (5), the Leontief system may also be rewritten in matrix notation as a 
vector function φ  that relates the structural matrix A and the final demand vector f  to 
total output: 
( ) ( )φ= = ⋅-1X A, f I - A f        (10) 
 
with [ ]ij ijij α α−⎡ ⎤ = =⎣ ⎦1(I - A) . From here: 
1
n
i
i ij j ij
j j
X f
f
φα α
=
∂= ⋅ ⇒ = ∂∑        (11) 
Notice that the coefficients ijα  can be interpreted as the partial derivative of total 
output of the i-th sector with respect to the final demand of the j-th good. This implies 
that if each sector’s final demand marginally changes by one unit, caeteris paribus, the 
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total effect on the production level of sector j is captured by the expression
1
n
ij
i
α
=
∑ , 
which is commonly and widely interpreted as the backward linkage of this sector. 
Nevertheless, as indicated in the introduction, it might be also subjected to some 
criticism since in equilibrium final demand changes in a sector are unresponsive to other 
sectoral final demand flows.  
Under Ghosh’s model conditions total output is a vector function ϕ  of the matrix of 
allocation coefficients, *A , and net national income or value added, VA , generated in 
each sector: 
1* *' ( , ) ' ( )ϕ −= = ⋅X A VA VA I - A                    (12) 
with 1 **( ) ijij α−⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦I - A  and 'VA  and 'X  standing now for row vectors. 
 Similarly as in (11), we find: 
* *
1
n
j
j ij i ij
i i
X VA
VA
ϕα α
=
∂= ⋅ ⇒ = ∂∑       (13) 
The allocation coefficients *ijα  can therefore be considered too as the partial 
derivative of the total output of a sector j-th with respect to value added in the i-th sector 
(Oosterhaven, 1988). Notice however that an increase in primary inputs in one sector 
would be unconceivable without a further simultaneous increase in the primary input 
requirements of the remaining sectors in the economy. Thus the assumption of caeteris 
paribus does not hold any more in the Ghoshian approach. This is the argument backing 
the implausibility of the Goshian model as a quantity model claimed by Oosterhaven 
(1988, 1989) and that has been widely accepted by researchers (Dietzenbacher, 1993, de 
Mesnard, 2009). 
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Once we have described the mechanisms and assumptions governing both models, 
we now proceed to prove that even though both models are in fact theoretically 
incompatible in their assumptions, if quantities are held constant, the Ghoshian 
approach is just a reformulation of Leontief’s price model.  
Proposition: If input-output ratios and output ratios remain constant (i.e. no changes in 
quantities take place) then Ghosh’s model reduces to Leontief’s. 
Proof: Let Z be the matrix of intermediate deliveries among sectors, [ ] ijij x=Z  and let 
Xˆ  be the diagonal matrix representation of vector X. The matrix A of technical 
coefficients is obtained as: 
1ˆ −= ⋅A Z X           (14) 
whereas the matrix *A  of allocation coefficients is computed as: 
1* ˆ −= ⋅A X Z          (15) 
Combining Expressions (14) and (15) we find: 
 *ˆ ˆ'= ⋅ = ⋅Z A X X A         (16) 
Hence the allocation matrix can be written as: 
1* ˆ ˆ−= ⋅ ⋅A X A X         (17) 
Rewrite (17) as: 
1* ˆ ˆ−− = − ⋅ ⋅I A I X A X        (18) 
Using the inverse of a sum of matrices2, we obtain: 
1 1 1 1 1* ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( )− − − − −− = − ⋅ ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅I A I X A X I X A I A X    (19) 
                                                 
2 See  H.V. Henderson and  S.R. Searle (1981) for the derivation of the inverse of a sum of matrices. 
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Expression (19) allows us to relate Ghosh’s inverse to Leontief’s technical 
coefficient matrix and output ratios. Next we need to show under which conditions 
exogenous variations in value-added lead to equivalent endogenous effects under both 
models. The balance accounting equation in value terms in Ghosh’s model is given by: 
*' ' ( - )⋅ -1X = VA I A                  (20) 
Substituting now Expression (19) into Expression (20) we can rewrite it as: 
 1 1ˆ ˆ' ' ( ( ) )− −= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅X VA I X A I A X                                      (21) 
Let us translate Expressions (20) and (21) into algebraic notation:            
*
1 1 1
*
1 1 1
n n n
j
j i ij i ik kj
i i k i
n n n
j
j i ij j i ik kj
i i k i
X
X VA VA a i j
X
X
X VA VA VA a i j
X
α α
α α
= = =
= = =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≠⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= ⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  (22) 
If there is any exogenous change in the value-added flow of sector i-th, and 
according to (22), the partial endogenous change in the j-th sector is given by: 
 
*
1
*
1
( )
1 ( )
n
j j
ij ik kj
ki i
n
j j
ij ik kj
ki i
X X
a i j
VA X
X X
a i j
VA X
α α
α α
=
=
∂ ⎛ ⎞= = ⋅ ⋅ ≠⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∂ ⎛ ⎞= = + ⋅ ⋅ =⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
    (23) 
This concludes the proof. Notice that, according to Expression (23), both the Leontief 
and the Ghosh models are simultaneously equivalent in their partial effects provided the 
output ratios ( )/j iX X  remain constant. But this is only possible if there are not any 
changes in quantities, neither endogenous nor exogenous (the partial derivatives in (23) 
refer to partial variations in value terms and in quantities), or the changes are 
proportional everywhere. In this case the own output ratio would remain constant which 
it is incompatible with Ghoshian endogenous quantity impacts, for when i=j the 
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quantity effects in (23) would then be equal to zero.  If quantities remain constant, the 
only difference between Leontief’s and Ghosh’s model is the way endogenous value 
impacts are expressed. Under the standard Leontief’s price approach endogenous 
changes refer to value changes per unit of output while under the “reinterpretation” of 
the Ghoshian model, price changes are expressed in absolute terms (Dietzenbacher, 
1997).  
This is in fact what justifies Dietzenbacher’s results whereby the Leontief and 
Ghosh models led to exactly the same endogenous changes as far as these changes relate 
to value (Ghoshian approach) or price changes (Leontief approach). In proving the 
Proposition, however, we have shown that it is only possible to formally draw these 
conclusions when the Ghosh model reduces to the Leontief approach, or the other way 
around. This suggests that the interpretation of the Ghosh model as a price model 
formulated by Dietzenbacher (1997) should rather be considered as a reformulation of 
the Leontief model itself under the assumption that quantities are held constant and only 
value effects are allowed to occur in the economic system. This observation was first 
suggested by de Mesnard (2009a). Additionally, we have also proven that both models 
are simultaneously incompatible when analysing quantity changes. This has also an 
important implication for the validity of the so-called “mixed-model” that merges 
aspects of both input-output models. Since the allocation and production mechanisms 
presented in Expressions (2) and (9) are simultaneously incompatible, mixed-models 
loose their theoretical appeal. The conclusion is that they should not be used in a 
combined way to measure inter-industrial linkages as some authors have done in the 
past to measure push-effects using Ghosh’s model (Mesnard, 2009b).  
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3. CLOSING GHOSH’S MODEL.  
The previous results show why Ghosh’s model reduces to Leontief’s and provides 
additional support for Dietzenbacher’s reinterpretation. But can Ghosh’s model itself be 
reclaimed from its implausibility clause? Are there any socio-economic rules for which 
Ghosh’s vision of the economic game make still some sense? We will approach this 
issue considering a non-market economy where decisions on output allocation are taken 
by a benevolent central planner whose mission is to enhance the collective good and 
guarantee a viable distribution of goods. This alleged economy comprises three 
productive units and distinguishes a private agent (citizens) and a public one (the 
planner).  The private agent provides labour services to all sectors and in exchange 
receives income (value–added) that is used to finance his consumption needs and his 
contribution to the sustainment of the collective. From this contribution the planner 
provides infrastructure services that are used in the allocation process. These services 
also provide value to the collective, which is in turn used by the public agent to 
facilitate goods to society in the form of public goods. The aggregate level of these 
public goods is of course constrained by the overall contributions to the collective.  
Let us begin considering a reference or benchmark allocation table for this 3 good-3 
sector, economy. The reference data in value flows for such an economy is represented 
in Table 1. Data in the Table represent an economic arrangement that is allocation 
feasible and budget feasible for all agents involved, and all magnitudes are value 
magnitudes.  
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Table 1: Benchmark allocation data 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 Sector 3  Private Agent Collective  Total 
Sector 1 x11 x12 x13  f1 c1  X1 
Sector 2 x21 x22 x23  f2 c2  X2 
Sector 3 x31 x32 x33  f3 c3  X3 
         
Value-added VA1 VA2 VA3      
Collective t1 t2 t3      
         
Total X1 X2 X3      
 
Because of viability the following accounting identities hold true: 
3
1
    ( 1,2,3)ij i i i
j
x f c X i
=
+ + = =∑       (24) 
3
1
   ( 1,2,3)ij j j j
i
x VA t X j
=
+ + = =∑       (25) 
In Expressions (24) and (25) we have that xij is the amount of good i flowing to 
sector j,fi is the consumption of good i by the private agent, ci is collective consumption 
of good i, VAj is income accruing to the private agent in sector j whereas tj is the 
materialization of the contribution to the collective. The identity in Expression (24) 
shows, by rows, the ‘output’ distribution for each of the goods. Using columns, identity 
(25) shows the ‘input’ repercussions of the said output allocations that are budget 
feasible. Because of a ‘Walras-like’ aggregate feasibility constraint (24) and (25) imply: 
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
i i j j
i i j j
f c VA t
= = = =
+ = +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑        (26) 
The left-hand side of (26) can be interpreted as national output as calculated from 
the expenditure side. The right-hand side, in turn, is national output as obtained from the 
income side. Alternatively, if the private and public agents behave so as to satisfy some 
sort of disciplined budget constraint, such as: 
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3 3
1 1
3 3
1 1
i j
i j
i j
i j
f VA
c t
= =
= =
=
=
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
         (27) 
then the national output accounting identity (26) follows from aggregation of the budget 
constraints in (27).  
In matrix terms the input-output data information in Table (1) takes this shape: 
⋅ + + =Z e f c X                 (24’) 
' ' ' '⋅ + + =e Z VA t X                 (25’) 
where e is a summation vector. The rest of the notation for matrix Z and vectors f, c, 
'VA  and 't  is self-explanatory, while e ( 'e ) denotes a column (row) vector. Let us 
define now the matrix A* of ‘allocation’ coefficients, that is to say, the information on 
how output is sectorally distributed among productive agents: 
[ ] 1 *ˆ* ijijij ij
i
Z
a
X
− ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ⋅ = = ⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
A X Z        (28) 
The notation, Xˆ , as before, stands for the diagonalised version of vector X while 
1ˆ −X  is the inverse matrix of Xˆ . Solving for Z in Expression (28) and substituting in 
identity (25’) we obtain now an equation in X: 
* *ˆ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '⋅ + + = ⋅ ⋅ + + = ⋅ + + =e Z VA t e X A VA t X A VA t X    (29) 
This equation corresponds to the familiar ‘supply-driven’ Ghosh’s equation and 
allocated output can be meaningfully solved provided matrix A* satisfies the usual 
productivity condition: 
1*' ( ' ') ( )−= + ⋅ −X VA t I A        (30) 
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We will now postulate a possible closing for value-added. Define the coefficient iλ  as 
value-added per unit of aggregate private consumption and dj as the allocation 
coefficient for private consumption of good j: 
3
1
i
i
jj
j
j
j
VA
f
f
d
X
λ
=
=
=
∑
         (31) 
Because of (31) we find: 
3
1
i i j j
j
VA d Xλ
=
= ⋅ ⋅∑            (32) 
so that in compact matrix terms (32) becomes: 
11 1
22 2 1 2 3
3 3 3
( , , ) '
XVA
XVA d d d
VA X
λ
λ
λ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
VA λ d X               (33) 
where the matrix '⋅λ d  reflects the allocation coefficients for private consumption in 
terms of value-added. Under this possible closed version of the Ghoshian approach, this 
matrix allows endogenising changes in value added VA generated and accumulated by 
the private agent when there is an exogenous change in that part of the production value 
contributed to the collective, i.e. t.  
We now incorporate Expression (33) into (29) via its transpose: 
' ( ' ) ' ' ( ') ' ' '= ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅VA λ d X X λ d X d λ                (34) 
and we then obtain: 
* *' ' ' ' ' ' ' '= ⋅ + + = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +X X A VA t X A X d λ t               (35) 
We can now solve again for 'X  under this additional assumption to obtain: 
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( ) 1*' ' ' −= ⋅ − − ⋅X t I A d λ                 (36) 
The inverse matrix in Expression (36) can be interpreted as the ‘extended’ Ghosh 
inverse since it incorporates allocation coefficients for material flows, A*, and value-
added flows, '⋅d λ . Supply shocks are caused by the exogenous actions of the central 
planner as represented by changes decreed in contributions to the collective, 'Δt , for 
example. The output vector 'X  that satisfies condition (36) can be interpreted as an 
‘allocation equilibrium’ for this economy, and such an equilibrium turns out to be 
consistent with the allocation rules implicit in A* and '⋅d λ  and with the value of 
contributions to the collective, i.e. 't . Allocated output is coherently distributed among 
sectors while at the same time it is value feasible. The new ‘equilibrium’ can be 
visualized in differential terms from:    
( ) 1*' ' ' −Δ = Δ ⋅ − − ⋅X t I A d λ         (37) 
Provided the extended allocation matrix * '+ ⋅A d λ  is also productive, in the sense 
that *( ') ' '+ ⋅ ⋅ ≤A d λ X X  for all possible row vectors ' 0≥t , then the new ‘equilibrium’ 
defined in (37) might be also rewritten as a power series of the form: 
( ) ( ) ( )2* * *' ' ' ' ' ' ... ' ' ...kΔ = Δ + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ + + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ +X t t A d λ t A d λ t A d λ  (38) 
 
Expression (37) indicates that the endogenous effect on output levels can be 
decomposed into the following components: the “pure” impact of the contribution to the 
collective that adds value to production, i.e. 'Δt . This “pure” impact in output should be 
allocated in the system in the form of intermediate and private final demand, i.e. 
( )*' 'Δ ⋅ + ⋅t A d λ  generating additional multiplicative effects in output levels. This 
“second-round” impact further increases production in the remaining sectors round by 
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round according the structure of the “allocation path” defined in (37), i.e. 
( ) ( )2* *' ' ... ' ' ...kΔ ⋅ + ⋅ + + Δ ⋅ + ⋅ +t A d λ t A d λ . 
4. CLOSING GHOSH’S MODEL: A NUMERICAL  EXAMPLE 
 
To illustrate the formal description and interpretation of the closed Ghosh model 
presented in Section 3, we use now a numerical example. We start using the 3 sector, 3 
good economy whose reference data in value flows is shown in Table 2a.  
TABLE 2a: Reference data: Numerical example 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 Sector 3  Private AgentCollective  Total 
Sector 1 30 20 10  35  5  100 
Sector 2 20 10 40   5 25  100 
Sector 2 10 20 5  30 35  100 
          
Value-added 20 10 40      
Collective 20 40 5      
         
Total  100 100 100      
 
This economic system has a benevolent central planner that decides to allocate 
additional resources to sector 1 in such a way that its value contribution increases by 1 
units of value. As an example, these additional exogenous resources decided by the 
central planner would be materialized in new equipment whose services could be used 
in sector 1 and that increases production levels either in value or quantity terms. This 
refers to what we have named the “pure impact” in Expression (37), i.e. 'Δt . This 
impact additionally boosts output levels due to the multiplicative effects generated by 
this supply shock in the remaining sectors according to the structure of the allocation 
path in (37), i.e. if additional intermediate demand is allocated to the remaining sectors, 
there would be endogenous supply effects coming from these sectors that further affect 
the output values in sector 1 increasing overall value-added in the system.  
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TABLE 3: Synthetic indicators after evaluating Δti=1 units sequentially in each 
sector. 
 % Endogenous Changes in “key” variables 
Exogenous 
    Shock 
ΔVA ΔX1 ΔX2 ΔX3 ΔX 
Δt1 =1 units  2.10  2.60  1.18  1.65  1.81 
Δt2 =1 units  1.29  1.08  1.81  1.41  1.43 
Δt3 =1 units   1.46  0.96 0.84  2.12  1.31 
 
 
As it can be asserted from Table 3, the impact of an identical unitary exogenous 
increase in the contribution from the collective is distributed in an unequal way, picking 
up the distinct values of the allocation coefficients in each sector. If the flow is 
contributed to Sector 1, for instance, total value-added in all there sectors increases by 
2.10 percent and, on average, total output increases by 1.81 percent. Differently to the 
open version of the Ghoshian approach, value-added changes everywhere and does so 
simultaneously and homogeneously. The homogeneity of the endogenous change in 
value-added is due to the “allocation rules” dictated by the matrix '⋅d λ . The set of 
Tables 2b-2d in the Annex show the readjusted allocation flows in sectoral detail. Note 
that each of the additional exogenous units contributed to each sector is fully and 
endogenously redistributed over collective consumption according to allocation rules. 
This is because, following the disciplined budget constraints defined in Expression (27) 
of this closed version of the Ghoshian approach, the exogenous unit contributed from 
the central planner cannot be withheld by the private agent but rather devoted to 
collective consumption.  
According to the simulation results presented in Table 3, if the benevolent central 
planner wished to maximise economy-wide effects, the contribution to the collective 
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should be decreed in Sector 1. This is so because the implied reallocation effects, both 
in value-added and in output, are higher here than those obtainable should the 
contribution be allotted in Sectors 2 or 3.  
 These conclusions are independent from the benchmark value flows of the 
contribution to the collective. Consequently, there is no need to perform any 
normalization to appraise their robustness. Notice that the exogenous shock is carried 
out homogeneously in all three sectors and the impacts in Table 3 depict the percentage 
between benchmark and simulated allocations.   
These numerical examples of the closed Ghosh model outlined in Section 3 
approximate better, we believe, the initial idea posed by Ghosh. In his seminal work, 
this author highlighted that his approach could be used, in planned economies, for the 
assessment of economy-wide impacts of government employment programs. The main 
question that Ghosh wanted to address using his modelling proposal was the following: 
if the labour force is forcefully allocated in a given sector, what would the economy-
wide impact be according to the allocation rules that are used in planned economies?. 
The economy-wide output impacts of the open version of this model turn out not to be 
value feasible when answering this question (Oosterhaven, 1988). Our close version, 
however, not only makes it possible to answer this question in a more plausible way but 
also helps in understanding the initial purposes of A. Ghosh.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper is simply to recover the initial purposes of A. Ghosh 
while trying to contribute to the long debate in the literature around his original model 
published in 1958. Since then, there has been an over-use of his model by researchers 
that, after some time, has given rise to an over-criticism.  The main target of this paper 
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is then to present a compromise between the two existing positions in academics around 
this issue.  
To this end we describe a way of closing the Ghoshian approach that resolves, to 
some extent, the implausibility problem that afflicts its open version (Oosterhaven, 
1988, 1989).  Supply shocks in this modified version of the Ghosh model stem from the 
actions of a benevolent central planner. This central planner exogenously contributes to 
production which will generate value to the economic system, applying it in one or 
more sectors. This initial impact is spread through the economic system further boosting 
output levels that, differently to the open version, are accompanied by simultaneous 
endogenous and allocation compatible increases in value-added. Therefore, closing 
Ghosh’s model makes it more plausible.  
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ANNEX OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 2b: Simulated percentage changes of the Reference data after evaluating 
an   exogenous supply shock in Sector 1: 1 1Δ =t units of value. 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 Sector 3  Private AgentCollective  Total 
Sector 1 30.78 20.52 10.26 35.91 5.13 102.60 
Sector 2 20.24 10.12 40.47 5.06 25.29 101.18 
Sector 3 10.17 20.331 5.08 30.49 35.58 101.65 
       
Value-added 20.42 10.21 40.84    
Collective 21.00 40.00 5.00    
       
Total  102.60 101.18 101.65    
 
 
TABLE 2c: Simulated percentage changes of the Reference data after evaluating 
an   exogenous supply shock in Sector 2: 2 1Δ =t  units of value 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 Sector 3  Private AgentCollective  Total 
Sector 1 30.33 20.22 10.11 35.38 5.05 101.08 
Sector 2 20.36 10.18 40.72 5.09 25.45 101.81 
Sector 3 10.14 20.28 5.07 30.42 35.49 101.41 
       
Value-added 20.26 10.13 40.51    
Collective 2.00 41.00 5.00    
       
Total  101.08 101.81 101.41    
 
 
TABLE 2.d: Simulated percentage changes of the Reference data after evaluating 
an   exogenous supply shock in Sector 3: 3 1Δ =t  units of value. 
  Sector 1  Sector 2 Sector 3  Private AgentCollective  Total 
Sector 1 30.29 20.19 10.10 35.34 5.05 100.96 
Sector 2 20.17 10.08 40.34 5.04 25.21 100.84 
Sector 3 10.21 20.42 5.11 30.64 35.74 102.12 
       
Value-added 20.29 10.15 40.58    
Collective 20.00 40.00 6.00    
       
Total  100.96 100.84 102.12    
 
